AZE.US
In a recent interview on the YouTube platform Echo Baku, Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov, a leading researcher at MGIMO and editor-in-chief of International Analytics, offered a revealing assessment of the evolving balance of power in the South Caucasus.
Beyond immediate tensions, his core argument was clear: even amid cooling rhetoric, Russia remains a strategic variable in Azerbaijan’s external calculus.
The “Hand of Moscow” Narrative and Political Agency
Addressing claims circulating in parts of Azerbaijan’s expert community about alleged Russian interference in domestic informational controversies, Markedonov argued that such accusations require verifiable evidence.
Without factual grounding, he suggested, references to “Russian special services” risk slipping into political conspiracy.
More importantly, he warned that consistently attributing internal developments to outside manipulation can undermine a country’s own political agency.
If everything is explained by foreign influence, the question inevitably arises: where does domestic responsibility begin?
Cooling Relations – or Strategic Recalibration?
Markedonov acknowledged that Azerbaijan, following the dramatic regional shifts after the Second Karabakh War, is pursuing greater strategic autonomy.
Baku today seeks maximum maneuverability – avoiding overdependence on any single power center.
At the same time, Russia views the South Caucasus as an area of immediate neighborhood, not a distant geopolitical playground.
“For Russia, the Caucasus is not a luxury. It is a region of direct proximity and strategic interest,” Markedonov noted.
Yet he stopped short of predicting any fundamental rupture. What we are witnessing, he suggested, is less a break and more a recalibration.
Why Moscow Could Still Be Useful to Baku
The most significant part of the discussion concerned Azerbaijan’s broader foreign policy positioning.
Markedonov argued that even if Baku continues to expand cooperation with Turkey, the United States, or the European Union, this inevitably comes with expectations and conditionalities.
Stronger defense coordination with Ankara, deeper energy ties with Brussels, or strategic engagement with Washington all create new frameworks of obligation.
In this context, Russia does not function as a patron – but as leverage.
“Having gained greater freedom on the Russian track,” Markedonov implied, “Azerbaijan may eventually need Moscow again – as a balancing factor in negotiations with other actors.”
This reflects a classic multi-vector strategy: ensuring that no single external partner gains monopoly influence.
From this perspective, maintaining functional – even if tense – relations with Moscow strengthens Baku’s bargaining position elsewhere.
Armenia, Elections, and the Illusion of Final Settlements
On Armenia, Markedonov stressed that even a signed peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan would not automatically resolve deeper structural issues.
Border delimitation, constitutional debates in Armenia, and internal political polarization remain unresolved variables.
Regardless of whether Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan retains power or not, Armenia’s strategic dilemma – between distancing from Moscow and managing security realities – will persist.
“There will be no end of history in the region,” he observed. “The South Caucasus will continue operating in a state of dynamic equilibrium.”
Balance, Not Alignment
The broader takeaway from the conversation is that the South Caucasus is entering a more fluid geopolitical phase.
Absolute alignments are unlikely. Tactical balancing is more probable.
For Azerbaijan, this means preserving strategic flexibility – including the option of re-engaging Moscow when it serves national interests.
In this framework, Russia is neither an inevitable ally nor an existential adversary.
It remains – pragmatically – part of the equation.