AZE.US
When Russian forces crossed into Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin appeared to expect a rapid collapse of Kyiv. Western intelligence assessments at the time suggested Moscow envisioned a swift decapitation of the Ukrainian leadership and the installation of a compliant government. The campaign was widely described as a matter of days, not years.
Four years later, the war has become the defining strategic failure of Vladimir Putin’s rule.
The Original Miscalculation
The central error was political, not military.
The Kremlin misread Ukraine’s identity, cohesion and willingness to fight. Russian planners appeared to assume that Ukrainian institutions were fragile, that President Volodymyr Zelensky would flee, and that Russian forces would face limited resistance in major cities.
None of that happened.
Instead, Ukraine mobilized society at scale. Civil defense networks formed within days. Western weapons flowed in. Kyiv held. The psychological momentum shifted almost immediately.
A war designed as a shock operation turned into attrition.
Military Reality Replaced Political Fantasy
Russia entered the invasion with roughly 200,000–220,000 troops – insufficient for rapid occupation of a country the size of Ukraine. Classical military doctrine suggests an attacking force requires numerical superiority to secure decisive breakthroughs. Moscow did not have it.
As the war dragged on, Russia resorted to partial mobilization, expanded contract recruitment, and the use of private military formations such as Wagner. Tactical gains came at high cost.
Estimates vary, but casualty figures on both sides are substantial. Equipment losses have been severe. Battlefield momentum has shifted multiple times, but no decisive strategic breakthrough has materialized.
Instead of a swift regime change, Russia found itself locked into grinding positional warfare.
The Economic Toll
The economic dimension has proven equally punishing.
Sanctions reshaped trade flows and constrained access to Western technology. Defense spending surged, redirecting vast budgetary resources toward the war effort. While Russia adapted in some areas, long-term structural strain is evident.
Ukraine has endured catastrophic infrastructure damage and industrial disruption. Yet it has also secured massive external support. European Union institutions and member states have provided roughly €190 billion in assistance, while the United States has delivered more than $130 billion in military and economic aid.
The war became internationalized in ways Moscow likely did not anticipate.
Strategic Trap
Four years in, Russia controls roughly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. But control has not translated into political victory.
The Kremlin faces a dilemma:
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Ending the war without clear gains risks domestic perception of failure.
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Continuing the war compounds economic, demographic and military costs.
Attrition favors no one, but it especially strains a state that entered the conflict expecting speed.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s statehood has hardened rather than fractured. NATO has expanded. Europe has accelerated defense coordination. The geopolitical architecture Russia sought to weaken has, in some respects, consolidated.
The Core Question
The war’s fourth anniversary forces a blunt assessment: what was meant to demonstrate strength has exposed limits.
The initial “four-day” premise – whether officially stated or implied – underestimated Ukrainian resistance, Western cohesion and the risks of escalation. The result is a protracted conflict that reshaped Europe’s security order and locked Russia into a costly confrontation with no clear exit.
The question now is no longer whether the plan failed. It is whether Moscow is prepared to recalibrate its objectives – or whether it will continue to invest in a war that has already exceeded its strategic logic.