Russia Has Already Lost – And the Post-Soviet Space Knows It

AZE.US

Wars do not always end with surrender. Sometimes they freeze. Sometimes they fade into negotiations that look like compromise. But there is another outcome – one in which a country continues fighting, holds territory, maintains the rhetoric of strength, and still loses strategically.

That is the position Russia faces today.

Even if Moscow secures a ceasefire close to its battlefield demands, the central consequence of the war has already taken shape. Russia no longer appears to be the unquestioned center of gravity across the post-Soviet region.

Four years of war have demonstrated the limits of military speed, the cost of prolonged confrontation for a sanctions-constrained economy, and the growing caution of traditional partners.

Most importantly, neighboring states are increasingly searching for alternative security and economic anchors. Strategic defeat rarely arrives in a single moment; it unfolds through the steady erosion of future influence.

The most visible shift is occurring in the South Caucasus, a region long viewed as structurally dependent on Moscow. Armenia is distancing itself politically and militarily. Azerbaijan is pursuing a more autonomous and diversified foreign policy. Turkey’s regional role continues to expand, while Western diplomatic and economic engagement is returning. Russia’s monopoly is dissolving in real time, and without control over its periphery, an imperial security model cannot endure.

A similar transformation is underway in Central Asia. Governments are diversifying partnerships, deepening ties with China, the United States, the European Union, and Turkey. Even limited Western military or diplomatic gestures signal that the region is no longer closed to competing influence. For the first time in decades, Russia must actively compete in spaces where its presence was once assumed.

Geopolitics ultimately rests on resources. A prolonged war strains budgets, slows technological development, and increases dependence on external economic channels.

Territorial gains, even if retained, cannot offset lost markets, persistent sanctions pressure, and structural stagnation. The cost curve of the conflict has already moved beyond any plausible strategic return.

The broader international system is also shifting. Europe is rearming. Defense spending is rising. Germany is pursuing large-scale military modernization. The United States is recalibrating global priorities while sustaining pressure on Moscow. Regional middle powers are expanding their room for maneuver. In this emerging order, Russia is no longer shaping the rules but attempting to preserve what remains of the previous balance – a classic indicator of declining power.

For that reason, the decisive question is no longer how the war formally ends or who signs the final document. The real question is what the geopolitical landscape looks like afterward. And in that future, Russia occupies a narrower, more constrained, and more vulnerable position than it did before 2022.

Strategic defeat, in other words, has already occurred – well before the final shot is fired.