By AZE.US Editorial Team
Azerbaijan has emerged from the Karabakh conflict militarily stronger, diplomatically more influential and closely allied with Turkey.
Yet two wars unfolding to its north and south could produce consequences more dangerous than the fighting itself. For Baku, the greatest risks may arise when the winners and losers are finally determined.
Azerbaijan has resolved its most pressing military and political challenge, restored its territorial integrity and significantly strengthened its international position.
Baku is no longer viewed merely as a small state caught between larger powers. It has become an increasingly independent regional actor with influence over energy supplies, transit corridors and the balance of power across the South Caucasus.
The peace process with Armenia, despite its unresolved issues, also offers grounds for cautious optimism. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, acknowledged that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan and spoken about adopting a new constitution.
His government has tried to persuade Armenian society that the country’s future development requires normalization with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.
These developments may create the impression that Azerbaijan’s most difficult geopolitical challenges are behind it. That conclusion, however, would be dangerously premature.
Political analyst Eldar Namazov, speaking on the Azerbaijani program “Diqqət Mərkəzi,” recently offered a warning that deserves serious consideration: the risks facing Azerbaijan may increase not during the wars around it, but when those conflicts approach their conclusion.
The Northern Risk
The Russia-Ukraine war continues north of Azerbaijan. Regardless of how it ends, its outcome could fundamentally reshape the security environment of the South Caucasus.
If Russia emerges severely weakened, it could face an internal political crisis, elite rivalry and growing centrifugal forces. For Azerbaijan, this would not be a distant or abstract scenario.
Russia’s North Caucasus directly borders Azerbaijan. Serious instability in Dagestan or neighboring regions could quickly affect the South Caucasus through refugee movements, disrupted trade, organized crime, religious radicalization or armed groups operating beyond Moscow’s control.
A weakened Russian central government would not automatically create a safer or freer region. The collapse of an established order often produces uncertainty before it produces stability.
A victorious or emboldened Russia could pose a different kind of threat.
After the war, Moscow may seek to compensate for lost influence elsewhere by reasserting its position in regions it continues to regard as strategically vital. The South Caucasus would be an obvious target.
Azerbaijan maintains an independent foreign policy, has strengthened its military alliance with Turkey and is expanding its relationships with Central Asia, Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Armenia, meanwhile, has increasingly attempted to reduce its dependence on Moscow.
Russia could interpret the transformation of the South Caucasus as a strategic retreat that must be reversed.
A Russian defeat could therefore produce instability, while a Russian victory could encourage a more assertive regional policy. Both outcomes would create risks for Azerbaijan, although their nature would be very different.
Iran: Between Internal Crisis and Regional Ambition
An equally serious challenge is developing south of Azerbaijan.
If the confrontation between the United States and Iran ends in a decisive defeat for Tehran, the resulting internal crisis would inevitably affect neighboring countries.
Iran has a population of about 90 million, a complex ethnic composition and a long border with Azerbaijan. Any breakdown of central authority could trigger mass migration, humanitarian emergencies, armed clashes among competing groups and severe disruption to regional trade.
Large-scale instability inside Iran would become a security challenge for the entire South Caucasus.
Yet an Iranian victory, or even Tehran’s belief that it had successfully resisted its adversaries, would not necessarily make Azerbaijan safer.
An emboldened Iranian leadership could pursue a more aggressive regional policy and attempt to restore or expand its influence. Azerbaijan could become a target of additional pressure because of its alliance with Turkey, ties with Israel, independent energy strategy and growing role in the Turkic world.
The dilemma resembles the one involving Russia: Iran’s defeat could unleash instability, while its success could intensify its external ambitions.
The Most Dangerous Scenario
The most alarming possibility would be for the Russia-Ukraine war and the US-Iran confrontation to reach decisive turning points at roughly the same time.
Azerbaijan could then face simultaneous instability along its northern and southern borders. Pressure on border security, trade routes, energy infrastructure and domestic stability would increase sharply.
Under such circumstances, responding to individual threats would not be enough. Azerbaijan would need an integrated strategy covering defense, border protection, economic resilience, information security and preparations for possible refugee flows.
Protecting oil and gas infrastructure would become especially important. So would maritime security in the Caspian Sea, the expansion of the Middle Corridor and the diversification of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade.
Baku must be prepared for a scenario in which routes through Russia and Iran are disrupted simultaneously.
Peace With Armenia Is Now a Security Imperative
Against this background, achieving a durable peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia becomes even more urgent.
Baku cannot afford to enter a period of potential upheaval in Russia and Iran while retaining an unresolved conflict on its western border. The reopening of regional transport links, mutual recognition of borders and Armenia’s definitive abandonment of territorial claims must help create at least one stable section of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical environment.
But expectations must remain realistic.
A growing number of Armenians appear to understand that the Karabakh chapter is closed and that their country must pursue peaceful relations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, revanchist forces have not disappeared. They retain political, media and religious influence and could exploit any regional crisis to challenge the postwar order.
A peace agreement must therefore be more than a symbolic declaration. It must eliminate the legal and political foundations for future territorial claims.
Victory Is No Excuse for Complacency
Azerbaijan is significantly stronger than it was five or 10 years ago. It has a capable military, a strategic alliance with Turkey, increasing influence within the Organization of Turkic States and an important role in Eurasian energy and transport security.
Success, however, can create its own strategic vulnerability.
History shows that countries make grave mistakes not only after defeats, but also after major victories, when they begin to view the new balance of power as permanent and irreversible.
Azerbaijan should not frighten its population with catastrophic predictions. But it should prepare society honestly for a period of profound uncertainty. National unity must be based on an understanding of the threats, not on the belief that they no longer exist.
Baku must plan for every plausible outcome: a weakened Russia, a resurgent Russia, a crisis inside Iran, a more assertive Iranian government, simultaneous instability on both borders, refugee movements, external pressure and renewed activity by revanchist groups in Armenia.
The end of the wars surrounding Azerbaijan will not necessarily bring peace to Azerbaijan.
It may instead mark the beginning of a much broader struggle to shape the next regional order. Azerbaijan’s place in that order will depend on how carefully it prepares today.
AZE.US