By Ulviyya Baghirova
Eighteen years after the August 2008 war, Russia and Georgia trade with one another, direct flights have resumed, and visa requirements have eased. Yet diplomatic relations remain severed, Russian troops remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the territories’ political status is unresolved. The absence of another large-scale war has brought a degree of stability, but it has not produced a lasting settlement.
For Azerbaijan, this is more than a dispute between two neighbours. Georgia carries Azerbaijani oil and gas to international markets and connects the country to wider transport networks. Although these routes do not pass through Abkhazia or South Ossetia, renewed escalation could disrupt trade, unsettle investors and undermine confidence in the South Caucasus as a reliable link between Asia and Europe.
Why the political deadlock persists
The conflicts emerged during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fighting in South Ossetia in 1991-1992 and Abkhazia in 1992-1993 caused deaths, displacement and lasting divisions between communities. Ceasefires stopped the fighting without resolving the political disagreements. Years of unsuccessful negotiations and rising tensions preceded the five-day Russia-Georgia war in August 2008. On August 26, Moscow recognised both territories as independent, a decision rejected by Georgia and most of the international community.
Russia remains central to the deadlock. Its military presence and political, financial and security support have made the two regions heavily dependent on Moscow. Russia consequently has considerable influence over their future, rather than acting simply as an outside mediator.
In its January 21, 2021 judgment in Georgia v. Russia (II), the European Court of Human Rights found that Russia exercised effective control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August 2008 ceasefire. It also found a violation concerning Georgian nationals’ inability to return to their homes. These findings concern responsibility for human rights violations; the judgment did not settle the territories’ political status.
Moscow presents its recognition as legitimate and its military presence as a security guarantee. Georgia regards the regions as occupied parts of its internationally recognised territory. Their local communities also have political concerns and fears that any lasting settlement must address. These positions remain difficult to reconcile: Georgia will not accept territorial loss, while Russia has shown no willingness to reverse its recognition.
Trade without diplomatic relations
Economic ties have nevertheless developed. Georgia lifted visa requirements for Russian citizens in 2012, before Georgian Dream came to power later that year. The new government sought improved relations with Moscow while maintaining Georgia’s position on territorial integrity. Russia introduced visa-free short visits for Georgian citizens in May 2023 and lifted its ban on direct flights. It expanded the visa-free regime in October 2024 to include work and study.
According to preliminary figures from Georgia’s national statistics office, merchandise trade between the two countries reached approximately $2.21 billion in January-September 2026. That figure measures trade in goods, not services or the full range of economic exchanges. Georgia imported substantially more goods from Russia than it exported there.
The political boundary remains clear. On August 11, 2026, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said diplomatic relations could not be restored while Moscow continued to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent. He also reaffirmed the government’s commitment to a peaceful settlement.
In my view, this illustrates the central contradiction in Russian-Georgian relations. Economic cooperation can reduce incentives for confrontation and benefit people on both sides. It can also make an unresolved situation easier to sustain. Trade offers a practical channel of contact, but does not by itself bring the parties closer to agreement on sovereignty, security or displaced people’s rights.
Daily life along the dividing lines
For conflict-affected communities, the absence of open warfare does not mean normal life has returned. Restrictions on movement, detentions, fences and other barriers can complicate access to relatives, farmland and medical care. These problems make the dividing lines a source of continuing insecurity even when relations between governments appear relatively calm.
There have been limited improvements. At the September 8, 2026 Ergneti meeting, EU and OSCE facilitators welcomed increased opportunities to cross the South Ossetian administrative boundary. At the October 22 meeting, they again welcomed the September changes while urging the full reopening of crossing points. They also expressed concern about continuing detentions, despite welcoming the release of some detainees. The easing matters to residents, but restrictions have not ended.
The risks can be deadly. In November 2023, Georgian citizen Tamaz Ginturi was killed by Russian border guards near the South Ossetian dividing line. The European Parliament condemned his killing. His death showed how a local incident could have grave consequences without a wider military confrontation.
Displaced families’ inability to return home remains another unresolved issue. An entire generation has grown up with separation, and prolonged isolation makes rebuilding trust harder. A settlement must therefore address the rights and needs of affected people alongside political status and security arrangements. Practical measures that make everyday life safer remain valuable while broader negotiations continue.
Why regional stability matters
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline carry Azerbaijani energy through Georgia. The Middle Corridor also gives the two countries an important role in trade between Asia and Europe. These connections make stability in Georgia a direct economic and security interest for Azerbaijan.
The 2008 war demonstrated the vulnerability of transit routes. BP temporarily halted the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline as a precaution, while reporting that neither had been damaged. A crisis can interrupt energy transportation even without a direct attack on the pipelines themselves.
During President Ilham Aliyev’s April 6, 2026 visit to Georgia, the two leaders reaffirmed mutual support for territorial integrity and highlighted energy and transport cooperation. Kobakhidze stressed the Middle Corridor’s growing importance. Their partnership shows what regional cooperation can achieve, and why unresolved conflicts remain a concern beyond the territories directly affected.
International mechanisms help contain that risk. The Geneva International Discussions maintain channels of dialogue, while the EU Monitoring Mission works to prevent renewed hostilities and build confidence. Its mandate covers all of Georgia, but the de facto authorities continue to deny its monitors access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Eighteen years after the war, renewed fighting is not inevitable. The danger lies in leaving the political, military and humanitarian causes of instability unresolved. Economic ties, dialogue and easier crossings can reduce tensions. Lasting peace will also require credible security arrangements, respect for rights and a future in which affected communities can live without fear and separation.
Short Author Biography
Ulviyya Baghirova is a lecturer at Baku State University and Baku Slavic University in Azerbaijan and a doctoral researcher in history at Baku State University. Her dissertation examines Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russian-Georgian relations from 1991 to 2022. Her teaching and research interests include international security, international relations, regional conflicts and political history.