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Armenia can no longer expect Russia to regard it as a friendly state if Yerevan is genuinely pursuing integration with the European Union, according to Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior research fellow at the APRI Armenia analytical center.
“If Armenia is indeed moving toward the European Union, regardless of how long that process takes or where it ultimately leads, it means that Armenia, from Moscow’s perspective, cannot be viewed as a friendly state,” Poghosyan said in an interview with CivilNet.
He argued that Russia is focused less on whether Armenia could realistically join the EU than on the direction of its foreign policy. Poghosyan placed the probability of Armenian membership in the bloc before 2040 at close to zero.
Even if the process takes several decades or ends with Armenia becoming a closely associated non-member state, Moscow may still interpret it as a strategic shift toward the West, he said.
Why Moscow’s Position Hardened
Poghosyan linked Russia’s tougher approach to a combination of developments, including Armenia’s adoption of legislation launching an EU integration process, its deepening partnership with Brussels, Yerevan’s request for assistance against alleged Russian hybrid threats and the Ukrainian president’s visit to Armenia.
In his assessment, those events may have convinced Moscow that Armenia is no longer simply diversifying its foreign relations but is making a long-term geopolitical choice.
Armenia remains a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and is still formally part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, although Yerevan has frozen its participation in the security bloc.
The country also continues to benefit from access to the Russian labor market, duty-free trade and relatively inexpensive Russian energy.
Poghosyan argued that Moscow is increasingly unwilling to preserve those advantages for a country whose government sees its long-term future within the European Union.
“Two Monologues” Instead of Dialogue
High-level contacts between the Armenian and Russian governments have continued despite the growing tensions. However, Poghosyan said those conversations increasingly resemble “two monologues” rather than a genuine dialogue.
“One side says what it wants to say, then the other side states its position, they thank each other for the conversation and return to their own affairs,” he said.
According to the analyst, Armenia has not clearly explained whether it intends to remain in the Eurasian Economic Union until EU membership becomes realistic or whether its current policy is limited to building closer relations with several global powers.
That ambiguity may be deliberate, he suggested. A definitive declaration of Armenia’s intention to leave the EAEU could prompt Russia to withdraw economic privileges immediately, years before EU membership becomes possible.
Analyst Warns of Tougher Russian Measures
Poghosyan believes Moscow may have set an unofficial deadline of December 2026 for Yerevan to either repeal its EU integration law or announce a date for a referendum on choosing between the EU and the EAEU.
No such deadline has been publicly confirmed by Russian officials, and the claim reflects the analyst’s assessment.
If Armenia takes neither step, Poghosyan said he would not be surprised to see tougher Russian measures beginning in January 2027. He identified several possible forms of pressure:
- Restrictions on Armenian citizens’ access to the Russian labor market;
- Limits or a ban on money transfers;
- Suspension of direct flights;
- Higher prices or disruptions to Russian gas supplies;
- Additional barriers for Armenian exports.
Poghosyan said bank transfers from Russia amounted to $3.9 billion last year, although part of that money was subsequently transferred out of Armenia. He also noted that Russian nationals account for approximately 40% to 41% of visitors to Armenia.
An estimated 70,000 to 80,000 Armenian citizens continue to travel to Russia for seasonal employment, he added. Measures affecting workers, tourism, remittances or gas supplies could therefore have a significant impact on Armenia’s economy.
Why Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan Are Treated Differently
Asked why Moscow appears to respond less aggressively when Azerbaijan strengthens relations with Ukraine and Europe, Poghosyan said Russia has historically had different expectations of Baku.
Azerbaijan has never belonged to the EAEU or the CSTO, while Turkey is widely recognized as its principal strategic ally. Moscow therefore does not view Azerbaijan’s foreign-policy diversification in the same way it views Armenia’s shift, he said.
Kazakhstan presents a more complicated comparison because it is a founding EAEU member, remains in the CSTO and simultaneously maintains strong relations with the EU, United States, China and the Organization of Turkic States.
Poghosyan suggested that Astana has been more successful in assuring Moscow that diversification does not mean abandoning the EAEU or making a geopolitical choice against Russia.
By contrast, he said, a view is taking shape in Russian political and expert circles that Armenia is becoming “a new Moldova or Ukraine.”
Russian Rail Concession Adds to Tensions
The future of Armenia’s railway system, which is operated under a long-term Russian concession, has become another source of disagreement.
Poghosyan suggested that the United States and EU may favor ending the concession because the Russian operator is under sanctions. He linked the issue to plans for transporting goods from Central Asia through Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan, Armenia and Turkey under the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP.
If Armenia wants part of that cargo to travel north from Nakhchivan through Yerevan, Gyumri and Kars, the Russian concession could become a practical obstacle, he said.
From Moscow’s perspective, however, canceling the arrangement at the urging of Western partners would mean losing both an economic asset and another instrument of influence in the South Caucasus.
What the Washington Agreements Achieved
Assessing the first anniversary of the August 8, 2025, Washington summit, Poghosyan identified a significant reduction in the likelihood of renewed hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia as its main geopolitical achievement.
He also pointed to closer economic relations between Armenia and the United States, particularly in digital technology and artificial intelligence.
The principal shortcoming, he said, is that Azerbaijan and Armenia have still not signed a final peace treaty.
At the Washington summit, the parties signed a joint declaration and initialed the text of the peace agreement in the presence of the U.S. president. Full normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia – and between Armenia and Turkey – nevertheless remains incomplete.
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