By AZE.US Editorial Team
Nikol Pashinyan’s proposed “Fourth Republic” is more than a new name for another Armenian government program.
Yerevan is attempting to redefine the purpose of the Armenian state: abandoning a country shaped by territorial myths and hopes of revanche in favor of a republic contained within internationally recognized borders.
For Azerbaijan, this could represent a historic shift. But for now, it remains only a possibility.
Baku should judge the project not by the scale of Pashinyan’s rhetoric but by three tangible outcomes: constitutional reform, the return of Azerbaijani enclaves and the practical reopening of regional transportation links.
Armenia’s government has approved its 2026–2031 program, which is built around the ideology of “Real Armenia” and the vision of a Fourth Republic. Pashinyan explicitly contrasted it with the Third Republic, saying the former state was founded on conflict and confrontation while the new republic must be built on peace. The distinction is set out in an official Armenian government statement.
This is more than political rebranding.
A State Instead of a Historical Project
The Third Republic, established after the collapse of the Soviet Union, formally existed within internationally recognized borders. Politically, however, it remained tied to the Karabakh project.
Armenian control over territories beyond those borders was treated for decades not as a temporary military situation but as part of a broader national mission.
Pashinyan is now attempting to dismantle that model.
In his concept, “Real Armenia” is a state covering 29,743 square kilometers – not an open-ended historical homeland whose borders can expand according to political ambitions.
Pashinyan has said Armenia’s mission should be to preserve and develop the country within its internationally recognized territory. He has also made a painful argument to Armenian society: territories once regarded as national acquisitions were held at the expense of Armenia’s sovereignty, security, prosperity and future. He outlined that position in an April address to parliament.
The Fourth Republic is therefore an effort to restart Armenian history ideologically, even if not legally.
Pashinyan is proposing that Armenia replace a state built around historical aspiration with one defined by clear borders, economic interests, relations with its neighbors and responsibility to its citizens.
It is also an admission that the previous model failed. Armenia spent decades seeking more territory but ultimately became more isolated, dependent and vulnerable. The Karabakh project did not strengthen Armenian sovereignty. It gradually made the country’s foreign policy dependent on Russia, diaspora politics and revanchist elites.
Pashinyan is now proposing the opposite course: renounce territorial ambitions, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, open borders and turn geography from a strategic liability into an economic asset.
Removing Karabakh From Armenia’s Future
The most important element for Baku is that Karabakh is no longer being presented as part of Armenia’s state program.
This goes beyond Yerevan’s forced acceptance of the realities created after 2020 and 2023. Pashinyan is attempting to remove Karabakh from Armenia’s political future and deprive revanchist groups of their central ideological cause.
That would constitute a fundamental shift.
Under the previous Armenian model, peace with Azerbaijan was portrayed as a concession. Under the new model, peace is supposed to become a condition for the Armenian state’s survival and development.
The main question is whether Pashinyan’s team can make this transformation irreversible.
A government can remove Karabakh from an official program, but it cannot eliminate the issue from public consciousness, school textbooks, church rhetoric, opposition propaganda and the country’s constitutional framework through a single Cabinet decision.
Opposition parties, former Karabakh elites, sections of the Armenian Apostolic Church and groups linked to Russia are likely to continue portraying the Fourth Republic as a project of national surrender. During the next serious political crisis, revanchism could once again become a tool in the struggle for power.
That is why Azerbaijan cannot be expected to accept rhetoric alone.
The Constitution Remains the Decisive Test
Baku has repeatedly called for the removal of provisions from Armenia’s Constitution that Azerbaijan says can be interpreted as territorial claims against it.
Until that issue is resolved, a dangerous contradiction will remain: Armenia’s government speaks about peace and internationally recognized borders while the country’s foundational documents retain links to the ideology of a previous era.
A Fourth Republic cannot be built on the constitutional foundation of the Third.
If Pashinyan is serious about closing the chapter of “Historical Armenia,” he must formalize the change legally. A new Constitution should define Armenia’s territory unambiguously and leave no room for future efforts to revive the Karabakh agenda through alternative interpretations of preambles, declarations or historical references.
This would not humiliate Armenia. Clear borders are the foundation of its sovereignty.
A state unable to separate its legal territory from its historical imagination risks once again becoming hostage to conflict.
The Enclaves Will Reveal the Value of Yerevan’s Words
The status of Karki, Barkhudarly and Yukhari Askipara will provide another crucial test.
Pashinyan’s acknowledgment that these settlements do not belong to Armenia is politically significant. But recognition without a mechanism for returning the territories remains a declaration rather than a settlement.
The enclave question is more complicated than the return of four border villages to Azerbaijan in 2024. Separate agreements will be required on access, security, roads and administration. Yet those complications should not become an excuse for indefinite delay.
If Armenia recognizes the territories as Azerbaijani, the next step should be an agreed timetable for their return.
Otherwise, “Real Armenia” risks becoming an ideology that accepts international borders only when doing so is convenient.
Peace Must Produce Measurable Benefits
Pashinyan understands that he cannot persuade Armenian society to abandon its previous national project with speeches about peace alone.
Armenians will need to see practical gains: open borders, new employment, cheaper logistics, increased trade and reduced dependence on Russia.
That explains the importance given to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, railway connections and normalization with Turkey.
For Armenia, reopened transportation links would provide a path out of decades of regional isolation. For Azerbaijan, they would create a direct land connection with Nakhchivan and Turkey while strengthening the Middle Corridor and supporting a new regional economy.
Here too, however, trains, border crossings and binding transit rules matter more than conferences and presentations.
Until cargo can cross the border through a stable and legally protected route, the geopolitical project remains a promise.
Baku Should Neither Rush Nor Obstruct the Process
Azerbaijan has an interest in Armenia’s transformation from a revanchist project into a conventional neighboring state.
A weak, isolated and embittered Armenia will inevitably become an instrument of outside powers. A sovereign Armenia invested in trade and regional stability could become a more predictable neighbor.
Baku should therefore not dismiss the Fourth Republic merely because Pashinyan proposed it. If Yerevan is genuinely abandoning territorial nationalism, Azerbaijan has an interest in that policy’s success.
But trust must not move faster than the facts.
The Fourth Republic will not become real when Pashinyan repeats its name for the fourth or tenth time. It will emerge when Armenia legally removes territorial claims, returns Azerbaijani enclaves, anchors peace in binding documents and opens regional transportation links.
Until then, the Fourth Republic is not a new state but a proposal to build one.
It is a bold, necessary and potentially historic proposal. Its true meaning, however, will be determined not by Pashinyan’s speeches but by the decisions he is prepared to make after delivering them.
AZE.US