AZE.US
Russian attacks on facilities linked to Azerbaijan and Turkey in Ukraine are not a demonstration of Moscow’s strength but evidence of its growing weakness and inability to achieve its strategic objectives, Azerbaijani politician and economist Natig Jafarli said.
Speaking on Media Türk TV, Jafarli discussed the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war, growing tensions within the Russian political establishment and recent attacks on Azerbaijani and Turkish commercial interests.
According to Jafarli, the war has shattered Russia’s image as an overwhelmingly powerful military state.
He noted that the fighting has already lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s participation in World War II, yet Moscow has failed to achieve a result that could justify the scale of its losses.
“When the war began in 2022, Russia controlled about 14% to 15% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. Today, it controls roughly 20%,” Jafarli said. “Can gaining another five or six percentage points over several years really be presented as a success story?”
He argued that the absence of a decisive victory is gradually weakening Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authority within the country’s ruling system.
Russia Preparing for Post-Putin Era
Jafarli believes competing groups within Russia’s elite are already preparing for the post-Putin period.
He said political figures, propagandists and imperial ideologues are beginning to compete for the support of the nationalist electorate created during Putin’s years in power.
According to Jafarli, this group represents a significant section of Russian society that continues to view foreign policy through the ideas of empire, territorial expansion and confrontation with the West.
“A struggle for this electorate is already underway,” he said. “Imperial ideologues and propagandists are searching for new political centers and potential leaders.”
Jafarli said discussions within Russian political circles and pro-government media increasingly suggest that Putin is no longer capable of delivering the results expected from him, even though such criticism often avoids naming him directly.
The Russian president appears to recognize the shift in sentiment, Jafarli argued, and is attempting to reassure military officials and supporters of a hard-line policy that he remains in control.
However, some of the Kremlin’s main arguments for continuing the war have lost their credibility, he said.
One of those arguments was the creation of a so-called buffer zone along the Ukrainian border. Moscow claimed that occupying additional Ukrainian territory would protect Russian cities from attacks.
But Ukrainian drones are now capable of striking targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from the front line.
“Suppose Russia captures another 20 kilometers in the Kharkiv region,” Jafarli said. “What is the purpose of that buffer zone if a drone launched from the 21st kilometer can still reach Moscow, St. Petersburg or another Russian city?”
He said two broad camps are emerging within the Russian establishment.
One includes economic and business figures interested in ending the war and normalizing relations with the West. The other consists of military, security and political forces that favor continuing the confrontation.
Putin previously served as an arbiter between such groups, Jafarli said, but is now increasingly viewed by both sides as part of the problem rather than the person capable of resolving it.
Why Russia Is Targeting SOCAR Facilities
Jafarli also addressed Russian attacks on assets connected to Azerbaijan and Turkey in Ukraine.
He referred to strikes on SOCAR filling stations, attacks on vessels owned by Turkish companies and incidents involving Azerbaijani crew members.
Russia cannot directly attack Azerbaijan or Turkey, he said, and is therefore attempting to pressure both countries by striking their commercial interests on Ukrainian territory.
He linked this approach to Baku and Ankara’s continued support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
“Azerbaijan and Turkey are not supporting international law because of personal sympathy for one side,” Jafarli said. “They support the principle of territorial integrity. Russia apparently expected other countries to endorse its war and accept the occupation of Ukrainian territory. Neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey intends to participate in that.”
Azerbaijan has repeatedly provided the Russian side with information about the locations of diplomatic missions, consular facilities and other sites connected to Azerbaijani citizens and companies, according to Jafarli.
Nevertheless, attacks have continued despite official warnings and diplomatic protests.
He said such strikes do not cause decisive damage to Ukraine but appear intended to punish Azerbaijan and Turkey for pursuing independent policies.
“What changes after a filling station is hit?” Jafarli asked. “Does Ukraine suddenly run out of gasoline? No. Fuel can even be sold from mobile tankers.”
Ukraine, by contrast, has targeted Russian oil refineries and production facilities, he said.
“A filling station sells fuel. A refinery produces it,” Jafarli said. “That is why attacks on refineries can create fuel shortages and long lines at filling stations inside Russia.”
He described Moscow’s attacks on Azerbaijani assets as symbolic retaliation rather than an effective military strategy.
“This is not a sign of strength,” Jafarli said. “It is a sign of weakness.”
Russia Depends on Turkey in the Black Sea
Jafarli also pointed to Russia’s economic dependence on Turkey in Black Sea trade.
Russia exports grain, sunflower products, vegetable oil and other agricultural goods through Novorossiysk and other Black Sea ports. Turkish shipping and trading companies play an important role in transporting and distributing those exports.
“Russia may attack Turkish vessels, but it cannot conduct normal Black Sea trade without Turkey,” Jafarli said. “If Turkish companies stop working with Russian cargo, the consequences for Moscow could be serious.”
He noted that agricultural products are generally not covered by the main Western sanctions imposed on Russia.
Turkey can therefore legally purchase, process and resell Russian food products without violating sanctions, while earning revenue from transportation and trade.
By targeting Turkish and Azerbaijani interests, Russia risks damaging relationships that remain important to its own economy, Jafarli argued.
He said Moscow’s behavior is increasingly driven not by rational calculation but by an effort to project power as its actual ability to influence neighboring states continues to decline.
Russia can damage a SOCAR station or a Turkish-owned ship, he concluded, but such attacks do not alter the balance of the war. Instead, they reveal the limits of Moscow’s power and its frustration with Azerbaijan and Turkey’s refusal to follow the Kremlin’s political line.
AZE.US