By AZE.US Editorial Team
Robert Kocharyan’s arrest does not erase legitimate questions about his family’s wealth. But when law enforcement acts immediately after a public threat from the prime minister, an anti-corruption campaign begins to resemble political revenge.
In the same week that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced plans to formally apply for European Union membership, a court ordered the arrest of one of his most prominent political opponents, former President Robert Kocharyan.
The juxtaposition is more revealing than any policy speech. Yerevan is declaring its commitment to European institutions while demonstrating political methods that sit uneasily with judicial independence, separation of powers and the presumption of innocence.
An Armenian court ordered Kocharyan held for two months on Aug. 27. His eldest son, Sedrak Kocharyan, had been remanded into custody a day earlier.
The former president faces three counts of abuse of power, two counts of accepting an especially large bribe and four counts of large-scale money laundering.
These are serious allegations.
Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Committee claims that during Kocharyan’s 1998-2008 presidency, valuable state assets were transferred to companies linked to him and his associates at prices substantially below market value. Investigators say affiliated businesses were then used to conceal the properties’ real ownership and alleged criminal origins.
Authorities are also examining transfers made in Sedrak Kocharyan’s name between 2001 and 2019 totaling approximately 144 billion drams, $309 million, €77 million and 18 million Russian rubles. More than 30 properties in Armenia and abroad are reportedly being reviewed.
The figures are enormous. They demand a thorough investigation and a transparent trial – not political declarations of guilt from the head of government.
Azerbaijanis have no reason to romanticize Robert Kocharyan or forget his record. His political career is inseparable from the most destructive period of the Karabakh conflict, the prolonged occupation of Azerbaijani territories and an Armenian system of power built around a close alliance with Moscow.
But the rule of law is not tested by how the state treats popular or sympathetic defendants. It is tested precisely when an unpopular politician with a deeply controversial record is placed before a court.
Pashinyan Delivered His Verdict Before the Court
The credibility problem surrounding the case stems not only from the allegations but also from the sequence of events.
On Aug. 24, Pashinyan clashed in parliament with Kocharyan’s younger son, opposition lawmaker Levon Kocharyan. The lawmaker accused the prime minister of pressuring judges and law enforcement agencies and publicly deciding who should be imprisoned or stripped of property.
Pashinyan responded by questioning how the Kocharyan family had accumulated its fortune. He declared that Levon Kocharyan would not be allowed to pass his millions to his children because illegally acquired assets should be returned to the state.
“This will not happen,” Pashinyan said. “Interpret it however you want. For me, this is a political question, not a personal one.”
Less than 24 hours later, investigators raided dozens of locations linked to the Kocharyan family. Robert and Sedrak Kocharyan were detained.
That timing does not prove that the criminal case was fabricated. The scale of the operation suggests that the investigation had been underway for some time. But Pashinyan’s public intervention damaged the process before a judge heard the evidence.
When a prime minister announces that a political opponent will lose his fortune and law enforcement officers arrive the next morning, the public is entitled to question whether investigators are acting independently or carrying out a political order.
The Associated Press reported that the raids came less than 24 hours after the parliamentary confrontation.
A ruling party leader, Ruben Rubinyan, went even further, declaring that “justice is the people’s revenge.”
No. Justice cannot be revenge – personal, partisan or supposedly popular.
Revenge begins with the assumption of guilt. A court must establish guilt. Revenge demands punishment in advance. The rule of law requires evidence, a defense and an impartial judge.
When senior government figures describe criminal prosecution as revenge, they validate the opposition’s darkest claims about the political use of state institutions.
Fighting Corruption or Clearing the Pro-Russian Field?
Kocharyan’s arrest did not occur in a political vacuum.
Since Pashinyan’s re-election in June, several influential government opponents have faced arrest, detention or prosecution. Opposition figure Gagik Tsarukyan has been held in pretrial custody, while businessman Samvel Karapetyan has been placed under house arrest. Legal action has also targeted Armenian Apostolic Church leaders and other government critics.
Many of those affected are associated with the pro-Russian segment of Armenia’s political establishment. Reuters described Kocharyan’s detention as part of a broader crackdown on government critics and noted that several of the principal targets are viewed as aligned with Moscow.
The campaign therefore has both domestic and geopolitical dimensions.
At home, Pashinyan is dismantling the country’s most heavily financed centers of opposition. Abroad, he is signaling to the Kremlin that the era in which Moscow could shape Armenian politics through friendly former presidents, business figures and political parties is ending.
The arrest is undoubtedly a message to Russia. But it is also a warning to Armenia’s political class: the state bureaucracy and law enforcement system are now firmly controlled by the government.
Democratic institutions, however, cannot depend on the good intentions of one leader. A legal apparatus used today against a pro-Russian opposition can tomorrow be turned against pro-Western critics, independent journalists or dissenters within the governing party itself.
Europe Appears Willing to Look Away
Almost simultaneously with Kocharyan’s detention, Pashinyan said Armenia would begin preparing a formal application for EU membership “in the near future.”
Under the plan described by the prime minister, Armenia would first submit its application, wait for Brussels’ response and discuss a possible accession roadmap. Only then would the government hold a national referendum.
The announcement represents a historic geopolitical shift, but applying for EU membership and joining the bloc are entirely different matters.
Armenia would have to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, strengthen judicial independence, reform state institutions and bring a vast body of domestic law into line with European standards.
The country also remains a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and is heavily dependent on Russian energy, trade and infrastructure. Full integration into the EU single market would eventually force Yerevan to choose between two incompatible economic systems.
There is an even more fundamental contradiction. A government cannot credibly promise a European future while turning the judicial system into an instrument of “the people’s revenge.”
Brussels currently appears more interested in the direction of Armenia’s geopolitical movement than in the quality of its institutions. Pro-Russian opponents of Pashinyan are unlikely to attract much sympathy in Europe, giving Yerevan considerable room to act without facing meaningful Western criticism.
That is dangerous shortsightedness.
If the EU measures Armenian democracy primarily by the country’s distance from Moscow, European values will become little more than geopolitical branding. The West would then be repeating a familiar mistake: tolerating authoritarian practices from a government because it happens to be moving in a strategically convenient direction.
Why Azerbaijan Should Care
Baku should not interfere in Armenia’s domestic power struggle, much less choose between Pashinyan and Kocharyan. Azerbaijan does, however, have a direct interest in a stable and predictable neighboring state where international commitments are upheld by institutions rather than by one politician.
A lasting peace agreement, the opening of transportation links and long-term regional stability cannot rest solely on Pashinyan’s personal authority.
If Armenia’s entire political system depends on one leader, any agreement becomes vulnerable to an election defeat, a domestic crisis or the eventual emergence of a new government. Sustainable peace requires institutional continuity, not only a handshake between current leaders.
That is why the developments in Yerevan should be viewed without illusions.
Former Armenian officials must answer for corruption and abuses of power if their guilt is proven. Kocharyan’s political history must not grant him immunity from prosecution. But Pashinyan cannot serve as accuser, judge and enforcer at the same time.
If prosecutors possess the evidence they claim to have, Armenia should provide an open trial, full access for the defense, independent judicial review and credible international observation. Only then can the Kocharyan case become an example of a state confronting corruption rather than another episode of political retribution.
Armenia has the right to choose Europe over Russia. But it cannot reach Europe on a road paved with “the people’s revenge.”
AZE.US