AZE.US
Armenia no longer treats Russia as a genuine security ally, although the two countries’ extensive treaty framework remains formally intact, Armenian political analyst Narek Sukiasyan said.
The growing divide between Yerevan and Moscow could expose Armenia to pressure through Russian gas prices, grain supplies, strategic infrastructure and the status of Armenian workers in Russia, Sukiasyan warned in an interview with CivilNet.
The political scientist, a researcher at Yerevan State University’s Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies, argued that Moscow has not yet used its full arsenal of economic leverage against Armenia.
Alliance Remains on Paper
Armenia’s new government program no longer describes relations with Russia as allied or even strategic. Instead, it refers to a “structural transformation” of bilateral ties and identifies Moscow simply as a partner.
Other countries, including France and Iran, are described as strategic partners.
According to Sukiasyan, the change in language formalizes a process that began after the September 2022 escalation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, when Yerevan appealed to Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization for assistance but did not receive the response it expected.
Because an alliance is based primarily on mutual security assistance, Armenia has effectively stopped viewing Russia as a strategic security ally since then, he said.
However, the extensive legal framework governing Armenian-Russian relations remains in effect. It includes treaties defining the relationship as allied and setting out commitments on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.
Sukiasyan warned Yerevan against rushing to dismantle that framework.
Russia, he said, often relies on legal arguments and treaty obligations when they support its interests. Combined with Moscow’s overwhelming economic and political advantage over Armenia, that legalistic approach could give Russia additional tools against Yerevan.
“If something does not work, let it remain inactive. There is no need to abolish it immediately,” Sukiasyan said, arguing that formally terminating existing agreements would create more problems at a time when bilateral relations are already strained.
He also cited the Russia-Azerbaijan declaration on allied interaction as an example of how official terminology does not necessarily determine the actual quality of relations. Political actors may emphasize or omit such labels depending on the context, he noted.
Armenia Still Depends on Russia
Sukiasyan said Armenia’s preferred approach should be to separate areas of disagreement from sectors where cooperation remains essential.
Food security, energy supplies and broader socioeconomic stability still require engagement with Russia, at least until Armenia develops viable alternatives.
“From the standpoint of Armenia’s interests, this cooperation remains necessary in the short and medium term,” he said.
Restrictions imposed so far have largely affected Armenian goods exported to Russia. Russian authorities have repeatedly reported sanitary or regulatory problems involving Armenian agricultural products.
But Sukiasyan said restrictions on Russian exports to Armenia could inflict far greater damage.
The pressure points available to Moscow include:
- renegotiating the price of Russian gas;
- restricting wheat and other grain supplies;
- tightening employment rules for Armenians in Russia;
- creating licensing or residency problems;
- using Russian-controlled strategic infrastructure as leverage.
“Even wheat and grain supplies alone represent an extremely serious instrument of pressure,” he warned.
Gas prices could become another critical issue when supply terms are renegotiated near the end of the year or in early 2027.
“Russia has not yet used its entire arsenal,” Sukiasyan said, expressing hope that relations would not deteriorate to the point where Moscow activates its most painful economic tools.
Railways, Nuclear Power and the Military Base
The analyst identified Armenia’s institutional choice between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union as one of Moscow’s primary red lines.
Russia is also concerned about the future of strategic assets in Armenia, including the energy system, the railway network, the nuclear power sector and, to some extent, the Russian military base.
Armenia has raised the possibility of changing the terms under which its railway is operated by a Russian company. Moscow also wants to build Armenia’s next nuclear power unit and maintain its long-term influence over the country’s energy sector.
Sukiasyan said the current crisis cannot be attributed solely to Armenia’s European integration agenda. Several disputes intensified almost simultaneously, creating what he described as a “snowball effect.”
The railway concession, the future of the nuclear power plant, Armenia’s relations with the United States and its declared European trajectory have all become part of a wider confrontation.
Domestic political considerations have added to the tension. Russian officials and media figures have openly engaged with or expressed support for Armenian opposition groups, while Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has increasingly emphasized closer ties with Europe.
EU Membership Remains Unrealistic
Sukiasyan said officials in Brussels, Yerevan and Moscow understand that Armenia’s accession to the European Union is unrealistic in the short or medium term.
Until recently, Armenia’s policy was to bring its laws and institutions closer to European standards without declaring EU membership an immediate objective.
The strategy was intended to prepare Armenia for a possible future “window of opportunity” while avoiding an immediate confrontation with Russia and maintaining the country’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.
That position has now shifted.
Previously, Yerevan’s message was that Armenia could move toward membership “if” a realistic opportunity emerged. The new rhetoric suggests it will proceed “when” such an opportunity appears – implying that the strategic decision may already have been made, even if the timing remains unclear.
Sukiasyan said he could not determine whether Pashinyan’s announcement about preparing an EU membership application reflected a final strategic choice or another tactical attempt to raise the stakes with Moscow.
If it is a negotiating tactic, however, it could prove dangerous.
Russia is unlikely to interpret such a declaration as an invitation to compromise, he said. Moscow could instead conclude that its earlier suspicions were justified: that Armenia is using the economic benefits of EAEU membership to facilitate an eventual transition toward the European Union, which Russia increasingly views as hostile.
Such a move would be more likely to escalate the confrontation than persuade Moscow to soften its position.
Moscow May Demand a Clear Choice
Following the EAEU summit in late May, calls were made for Armenia to hold a referendum clarifying whether it intends to remain in the Eurasian bloc or pursue EU membership.
The issue could return to the agenda by the end of the year, placing additional pressure on Yerevan to state when such a referendum might be held.
Sukiasyan noted, however, that not every EAEU member may support forcing Armenia into an immediate geopolitical choice.
Kazakhstan has long insisted that the EAEU should remain primarily an economic organization rather than become a political bloc dominated by Moscow. Astana is also highly sensitive to questions of sovereignty and could view an ultimatum to Armenia as a dangerous precedent.
Yerevan should therefore work not only with Russia but also with Kazakhstan and other EAEU members to prevent the formation of a united front against Armenia, he said.
Alternatives Must Come Before a Break With Moscow
Sukiasyan argued that Armenia must use the remaining time to develop alternatives to Russian gas, grain, markets and infrastructure before attempting a decisive geopolitical shift.
Government agencies are working on diversification, he said, but efforts often intensify only after a crisis has already emerged.
The reported growth in trade between Armenia and the European Union should not be viewed as proof that the country has successfully redirected its economy away from Russia.
A significant share of that increase comes from a limited number of commodities whose export volumes and global prices have risen. Headline trade figures therefore do not necessarily reflect structural diversification.
“Whenever we see a number, we must examine its content and structure rather than looking only at the figure itself,” Sukiasyan said.
Foreign Policy by Announcement
The analyst also pointed to a discrepancy between Pashinyan’s statement about preparing an EU membership application and the government program adopted by parliament.
The program calls for Armenia to align itself with European standards and move forward when both Armenia and the EU are ready. It does not explicitly commit the government to filing an application in the immediate future.
Sukiasyan said the difference reflects a broader weakness in Armenian foreign and security policy: major announcements, particularly those concerning Russia, are sometimes made before a detailed strategy has been developed.
The diplomatic system is then forced to adapt to a political decision that has already been publicly declared.
Armenia and Russia therefore remain allies in legal terms, but much of the alliance’s previous political and security substance has disappeared. The key question is whether Yerevan can reduce its critical dependence on Moscow before the dispute expands into gas supplies, food security, strategic infrastructure and the rights of Armenians living and working in Russia.
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