By AZE.US Editorial Team
Nearly a year after the Washington understandings, the South Caucasus has reached the point where diplomatic promises must give way to concrete decisions.
The central conflict is becoming increasingly clear: Washington wants to accelerate the opening of regional transportation links, Moscow is trying to preserve its remaining leverage, and Armenia continues to maneuver between the two powers.
But Yerevan’s room for maneuver is shrinking.
Azerbaijani political analyst Eldar Namazov recently pointed to a growing imbalance between the steps taken by Azerbaijan and Armenia over the past year. Baku is completing highway and railway infrastructure extending to the Armenian border. It has also allowed certain foreign shipments to transit Azerbaijani territory on their way to Armenia and begun supplying petroleum products to the Armenian market.
Yerevan, meanwhile, has yet to deliver definitive decisions on two issues central to the peace process: constitutional reform and the opening of the transportation route through Armenia’s Syunik region.
The widening gap between infrastructure nearing completion on one side of the border and political deliberations continuing on the other is becoming one of the main obstacles to regional normalization.
Washington Wants Results
For the Trump administration, the proposed route through the South Caucasus is no longer merely a railway or highway project.
Washington increasingly appears to view it as part of a much larger strategic network involving energy, digital infrastructure, data centers and the transportation of critical minerals. The route could become a vital segment of the Middle Corridor connecting Central Asia, the Caspian region, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Europe.
Its geopolitical value is difficult to overstate.
The northern transportation route between Asia and Europe passes through Russia, which remains under extensive Western sanctions. The southern alternative runs through Iran, another heavily sanctioned state. Against this backdrop, the Trans-Caspian route is emerging as the most politically viable option for the United States and Europe — and potentially for China, which is interested in maintaining reliable trade links with European markets.
Washington therefore has a strong incentive to push the project forward.
Once the initiative has received the political backing and branding of President Donald Trump, prolonged delays will no longer look like routine bureaucracy. They could instead be viewed as a setback for the administration and its broader Eurasian strategy.
That helps explain the recent intensification of contacts between Washington and Yerevan.
Why Moscow Is Increasing the Pressure
For Russia, the emergence of a Western-backed transportation corridor across the South Caucasus would represent the loss of yet another instrument of regional influence.
Moscow’s concern is not limited to the appearance of an alternative trade route. Armenia’s railway system is currently operated by a subsidiary of Russian Railways, while Russian border guards maintain a presence along Armenia’s frontiers with Turkey and Iran.
The implementation of a new corridor could force Yerevan to reconsider this entire structure.
Armenia would have to decide who will operate the railway, provide security and control the movement of goods. Any reduction in Russia’s role would amount to a strategic retreat for Moscow.
Economic pressure on Armenia, new trade restrictions and increasingly hostile political signals from the Kremlin should therefore be viewed as part of a broader struggle over the future architecture of the South Caucasus.
Moscow understands that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border and the launch of new transportation links would sharply reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia.
Pashinyan’s Mistake Was the Sequence
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s fundamental mistake may have been choosing the wrong sequence of actions.
If Armenia genuinely intended to reduce its dependence on Russia, it first needed to complete the peace process with Azerbaijan, normalize relations with Turkey and secure alternative economic and transportation connections. Only then could Yerevan have challenged Moscow without exposing itself to potentially severe consequences.
Instead, Armenia began distancing itself politically from Russia before obtaining viable alternatives.
The result is an increasingly vulnerable position. Relations with Moscow have deteriorated, but a peace treaty with Baku has not been signed. The border with Turkey remains closed. The new transportation routes are not yet operational, while Russia’s economic and infrastructure presence in Armenia continues.
Washington is urging Yerevan to move faster. Moscow is applying pressure. Azerbaijan is waiting for Armenia to fulfill the commitments expected from it.
Peace Requires More Than Pashinyan’s Promise
The constitutional question remains one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations.
Azerbaijan maintains that references embedded in Armenia’s legal framework preserve the basis for territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Baku therefore wants those provisions removed before a final peace treaty is signed.
This issue cannot be settled through personal assurances from Pashinyan. Political leaders come and go, but treaties are concluded between states.
Baku is seeking a legal guarantee that will remain in force after Armenia’s next change of government. Without the elimination of conflicting legal claims, any peace agreement could remain vulnerable to a future political reversal in Yerevan.
At the same time, Armenia’s election results should not be mechanically interpreted as a referendum on peace. Low turnout does not automatically mean that most Armenians oppose reconciliation with Azerbaijan.
It does, however, reveal something important: Armenia has yet to develop a durable national consensus over the country’s future direction.
The Decision Now Belongs to Yerevan
Armenia can no longer indefinitely send different signals to Moscow, Washington, Brussels and Baku.
If Yerevan chooses peace and regional integration, it will have to formalize that choice through legal decisions, open transportation links and accept the realities of a changing regional economy.
If those decisions are postponed again, Armenia risks losing Russian protection without gaining the benefits that normalized relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey could provide.
The South Caucasus is entering a period in which strategic ambiguity is no longer sustainable. Moscow is fighting to preserve the old regional order. Washington is investing political capital in a new transportation system. Azerbaijan is completing its section of the necessary infrastructure.
The next move belongs to Yerevan.
The longer Armenia waits, the higher the price of that decision will become.
AZE.US