AZE.US
Iran is entering what may become the most consequential phase of its modern political history. The current escalation is not simply about military strikes or nuclear facilities. It is about the long-term viability of the Islamic Republic’s governing model.
According to REAL party chairman Natig Jafarli, the country resembles the Soviet Union in 1986 – structurally weakened, internally fatigued, yet not on the verge of immediate collapse. The system, he argues, has entered a transitional stage.
Beyond International Law
Jafarli maintains that the recent operation against Iran cannot be justified under international law. In his view, references to Iran’s nuclear program serve primarily as political framing. The deeper objective, he suggests, is systemic transformation.
This raises a broader question: if regime change becomes an accepted geopolitical instrument, what remains of the post-World War II security architecture?
The Long Campaign Against Tehran
The analyst argues that the current stage did not begin overnight. He traces its origins to the killing of Qassem Soleimani, which he views as the moment when a structured campaign to weaken Iran was set in motion.
First came the gradual dismantling or containment of Tehran’s regional proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Only after those external pillars were weakened did pressure begin to shift inward.
This interpretation frames the present escalation as the culmination of a multi-year strategic process rather than a spontaneous development.
Internal Weakness – External Acceleration
Jafarli believes Iran’s internal problems predate any foreign intervention. Economic stagnation, governance inefficiencies, social fatigue, and a generational demand for change have eroded the system’s long-term resilience.
External pressure, in this view, did not create the crisis but accelerated it.
However, he does not expect an abrupt regime collapse. Instead, he foresees a gradual transformation – a controlled, step-by-step adaptation resembling late-Soviet reforms rather than a sudden implosion.
The Elite Factor
A key variable, Jafarli argues, lies within Iran’s political elite. He suggests that recent developments would not have been possible without at least partial elite acquiescence.
Parts of the establishment may be prepared to recalibrate the system while preserving core structures. The tension between militarized institutions and civilian political actors could define the next stage.
Masoud Pezeshkian, as the only nationally elected figure with direct electoral legitimacy, may become a focal point for a managed transition.
Risk Of Fragmentation
One of the most sensitive questions concerns territorial integrity.
Jafarli warns that in the absence of a unifying national idea, ethnic nationalism may gain momentum. Historically, Iran relied either on monarchy or theocratic ideology as centralizing pillars. If the ideological glue weakens, centrifugal forces could intensify.
Unlike the Soviet model of suppressing ethnic identity under a supra-identity, Iran promoted a religious “ummah” framework to override ethnic distinctions. If that narrative erodes, ethnic dynamics may re-emerge more forcefully.
Regional Implications: The South Caucasus Dimension
For the South Caucasus, developments inside Iran are not abstract.
Northern Iran is home to millions of ethnic Azerbaijanis who are deeply integrated into state institutions. Azerbaijani-origin officials occupy significant political and military positions. This reduces the likelihood of immediate ethnic rupture.
However, in a fragmentation scenario involving Kurdish, Arab, or Baluchi movements, cross-regional dynamics could emerge.
A chaotic or unstable Iran would represent the worst-case scenario for the region – economically, politically, and security-wise.
At the same time, a stabilized and gradually opening Iran would create substantial economic opportunities. Integration into global markets could transform the country into a major investment destination, reshaping regional trade corridors and energy flows. Azerbaijan could benefit significantly from such a shift.
A System In Transition
Jafarli does not predict the immediate disappearance of the Islamic Republic’s formal structure. The name may remain, even as substance changes.
New civilian leadership, if it consolidates influence, may initially maintain critical rhetoric toward the West. However, such positioning could coexist with pragmatic engagement behind the scenes.
Iran’s transformation, if it unfolds gradually rather than violently, may redefine not only its domestic political order but also the strategic equilibrium of the wider region.
The key question is no longer whether change is coming – but whether it will be managed or chaotic.