By AZE.US Editorial Team
Negotiations surrounding Iran have entered a new phase, but it remains too early to speak of an imminent end to the conflict.
Washington is simultaneously threatening further strikes, tightening economic pressure and leaving Tehran a path back to negotiations.
This increasingly resembles a strategy of gradual exhaustion rather than an attempt to secure a rapid military victory.
Qatar said on August 4 that mediation efforts aimed at ending the US-Iran war had made progress. President Donald Trump maintains that talks with Tehran are already underway, but Iranian officials deny this, acknowledging only consultations with Oman over safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said progress had been achieved, although no final agreement had been reached. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suggested that a deal to reopen the strait could come soon.
Oil markets reacted immediately. Brent crude fell 5.3% on August 4 to settle at $79.36 per barrel. Yet the Strait of Hormuz remains largely blocked, while vessels attempting to cross it continue to face attacks.
Before the war, approximately one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed through the waterway.
Tightening and Releasing the Pressure
Azerbaijani lawmaker Rasim Musabekov argues that the apparent inconsistency in Trump’s statements may be part of a deliberate strategy.
According to Musabekov, Iran is subjected to maximum pressure, given a brief pause and then hit with another round of strikes and restrictions. He compared the approach to catching a large fish that is not immediately pulled from the water but gradually exhausted.
Washington’s actions broadly fit this pattern. Military strikes are followed by temporary ceasefires, limited permission to export Iranian oil is replaced by another blockade, and threats of a major attack give way to claims of diplomatic progress.
At the same time, the United States is targeting financial networks connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In May, the US Treasury sanctioned 12 individuals and entities accused of facilitating Iranian oil sales to China on behalf of the IRGC. Washington says its pressure campaign has disrupted billions of dollars in projected Iranian oil revenue.
The objective is clear: restrict Tehran’s ability to finance its military industry, nuclear program and network of allied groups across the Middle East.
Iran Is Weakened, Not Defeated
It would nevertheless be premature to describe Washington’s strategy as a complete success.
Iran is demanding control over vessels entering the Strait of Hormuz, as well as information about outbound traffic and the authority to intervene when it considers necessary. Under the proposed arrangement, Oman would provide clearance for ships leaving the Gulf.
If Tehran wins even partial recognition of such powers, it would be difficult to present the result as an Iranian capitulation. Iran would instead gain a formal mechanism for influencing one of the world’s most important energy routes.
Trump’s original objectives also remain unfulfilled. Iran’s nuclear program has not been eliminated, Tehran retains the ability to strike regional rivals, and the political system remains in place.
Iran has lost resources, infrastructure and some of its regional influence. But it still possesses a powerful weapon: the ability to inflict significant damage on neighboring economies and the global energy market.
Dismantling Iran’s Regional Network
The pressure campaign is directed not only at Iran itself but also at the regional architecture Tehran built over several decades.
Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Gaza has been weakened. The proposed system for governing Gaza would establish a Palestinian technocratic administration without Hamas participation, form a new police force and deploy international stabilization personnel.
Indonesia has been mentioned as a possible contributor to the multinational force, while Morocco has pledged training assistance.
If Hamas is deprived of heavy weapons and administrative control in Gaza, Tehran would lose another instrument of pressure against Israel and Arab governments.
The wider campaign should therefore be understood as a gradual dismantling of Iran’s system of influence. Washington is avoiding a full-scale occupation while attempting to deprive Tehran of money, allied forces, military infrastructure and room for political maneuver.
What It Means for Azerbaijan
Musabekov argues that the results of Trump’s policy are broadly favorable for Azerbaijan and Turkey.
A weaker IRGC would have less capacity to pressure Baku, threaten regional transport routes or obstruct new connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.
But a weakened Iran does not necessarily mean a safer Iran.
In March, Azerbaijani authorities said they had prevented several acts of sabotage allegedly planned by the IRGC. The reported targets included the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli Embassy, a synagogue and a leader of Azerbaijan’s Mountain Jewish community. Tehran did not publicly comment on the allegations.
For Azerbaijan, prolonged instability along its southern border presents several risks: attacks on energy infrastructure, refugee flows, smuggling, radicalization and imported inflation.
Higher oil prices can generate additional revenue for Baku, but those gains come with more expensive imports and greater security costs.
The Carnegie Endowment estimated that a sustained $20 to $25 increase in Brent crude could provide Azerbaijan with an additional $6 billion to $7.5 billion in annual export revenue. However, the sharp decline in oil prices on August 4 demonstrated how quickly that windfall could disappear following a single indication of diplomatic progress.
Azerbaijan Does Not Need Iran to Collapse
Baku’s strategic interest does not lie in the breakup of its southern neighbor or the continuation of an open-ended war.
Azerbaijan needs a predictable Iran that lacks the ability to threaten neighboring countries, attack energy infrastructure or dictate the future of the South Caucasus.
The collapse of Iranian state institutions could create an uncontrolled zone of instability along Azerbaijan’s approximately 700-kilometer border. The consequences could include large-scale displacement, armed groups operating near the frontier and disruption of regional trade.
The optimal outcome for Baku would therefore not be Iran’s disappearance but its transformation into a more restrained and pragmatic regional actor.
Washington is gradually weakening Tehran, but the final outcome of this strategy remains uncertain. Iran is under severe pressure, yet it continues to hold considerable leverage over the world economy through the Strait of Hormuz.
The contest will ultimately be decided there: between the power applying military and economic pressure and the state attempting to transform its own vulnerability into a global bargaining weapon.
AZE.US