By AZE.US
Following Armenia’s elections, the peace process with Azerbaijan is entering a more difficult phase. Yerevan is now expected to move beyond political declarations and begin implementing its commitments on TRIPP.
But Russian control over strategic infrastructure, pressure from Iran and resistance within Armenia are limiting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s room for maneuver.
Political analyst Ahmad Alili, speaking on the Novosti Kavkaza YouTube channel, said tensions and mutual suspicion are returning after a period of diplomatic progress between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In his assessment, the central question is no longer whether Yerevan is prepared to talk about peace. It is whether Armenia can carry out the agreements it has made, particularly those involving TRIPP and the opening of regional transport links.
Baku and Washington are seeking practical action. Russia and Iran, by contrast, have strong reasons to oppose a transport route involving a U.S. presence in the region. Influential political forces inside Armenia also remain resistant to the emerging settlement model.
Why the West Is Reassessing the South Caucasus
Alili said renewed U.S. and European interest in the South Caucasus is about more than transportation links between Europe and Central Asia. Western policymakers have discovered that several long-standing assumptions about the region no longer match reality.
He identified three developments that have shocked political circles in Brussels.
The first was Georgia’s changing relationship with the European Union. Georgia was long viewed as the EU’s most consistent partner in the South Caucasus and the regional country with the strongest prospects for European integration. Its domestic trajectory and growing tensions with Brussels have undermined that assumption.
The second was the depth of Armenia’s institutional dependence on Russia. Western policymakers, Alili argued, overestimated Yerevan’s freedom of action and underestimated Moscow’s role in Armenia’s economy, energy sector, rail system and border security.
The third was Azerbaijan’s position on Ukraine, which he said was not anticipated in Brussels and prompted European officials to reconsider earlier assessments of Baku.
“The old analytical frameworks no longer work. The South Caucasus has to be studied again,” Alili said.
Why Pashinyan Slowed Down After the Election
Before the election, Pashinyan’s government appeared eager to advance the peace process and open regional communications. Alili said that sense of urgency faded after the vote.
The Armenian prime minister’s team secured the political outcome it wanted and is now reluctant to move quickly on decisions that could trigger a new domestic confrontation.
Internal calculations, however, are only part of the explanation. Alili said Yerevan is under significant external pressure from Russia and Iran and lacks the diplomatic and economic resources needed to resist it.
Pro-Russian groups continue to wield considerable influence inside Armenia. Their objective is not necessarily to reject peace under all circumstances, but to preserve a model in which Moscow remains the primary broker, retains control over regional communications and continues to shape relations between Baku and Yerevan.
Russian Control Limits Yerevan’s Options
Alili described Armenia’s limited control over its own strategic infrastructure as the most serious obstacle to implementing TRIPP.
Russian border guards have withdrawn from some checkpoints but remain present along parts of Armenia’s border. The country’s railway system is still tied to Russian structures, while Moscow also retains substantial influence in the gas and electricity sectors.
As a result, Pashinyan may be able to make political commitments without possessing all the mechanisms required to implement them.
The railway component is particularly difficult. If infrastructure needed for a new regional route remains under Russian control, launching a project involving the United States without Moscow’s consent becomes considerably harder.
For that reason, Alili argued, TRIPP is a test not only of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations but also of Armenia’s effective sovereignty.
Iran Opposes a U.S. Role
Tehran also strongly objects to U.S. involvement in TRIPP. Iranian officials have repeatedly signaled that they do not want American-linked infrastructure operating near Iran’s northern border.
Alili said Iran’s position has been underestimated in regional discussions. Tehran retains political and other levers over Armenia and wants to demonstrate that it can obstruct projects it views as a threat to its interests.
Yerevan is therefore caught between competing demands. Moscow and Tehran want the project slowed or blocked, while Washington is pressing for implementation. Baku is also demanding that the agreed conditions be put into practice.
According to Alili, Armenia’s government may seek to buy time by using domestic disputes, public campaigns and diplomatic controversies as reasons to delay concrete decisions.
Baku Returns to the Terms of TRIPP
After the Armenian election, Azerbaijan began returning to issues it had temporarily kept out of the foreground to avoid influencing Armenia’s domestic political process.
These include the operation of entry and exit points along the route through Armenian territory, security guarantees and provisions for unimpeded passage.
Alili said the TRIPP implementation framework agreed by Washington and Yerevan contains elements that do not fully reflect Azerbaijan’s position. He argued that it was always likely that Baku would revisit those issues once the election was over.
Azerbaijani participation in the route is often portrayed inside Armenia as a threat to sovereignty. Alili rejected that argument, saying joint implementation could reduce Armenia’s one-sided dependence on Russia and give Yerevan additional economic and political options.
Diplomats’ Karabakh Visit Signals a New Approach
A visit by foreign diplomats accredited to Azerbaijan to Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur offered another indication that Western policy is changing.
The trip prompted sharp criticism in Armenia, including attacks on individual ambassadors and the countries they represent. Alili described that reaction as an effort to preserve outdated perceptions of the region.
In his view, the diplomats’ visit to Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory reflected an acceptance of both the new regional reality and established principles of international law.
The participation of representatives from countries that had declined similar visits in the past was particularly significant. Earlier refusals had been viewed in Baku as an unwillingness to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in practice.
Europe Is Speaking to Baku With Different Voices
Alili also pointed to a widening gap between official European diplomacy and the rhetoric heard from some parliamentary, media and civil-society groups.
At the government level, many European states are interested in stability, transport connectivity and closer relations with Azerbaijan. The European Parliament and parts of the media and policy community, however, remain considerably more critical of Baku.
The analyst said Azerbaijan needs to invest more heavily in public diplomacy. For years, the limited presence of Azerbaijani perspectives on Western policy and expert platforms allowed other actors to shape an almost uncontested narrative about the region.
That environment is beginning to change, but older assumptions continue to influence debate over the peace agreement, Karabakh and TRIPP.
Peace Exists, but Trust Still Does Not
The defining phrase of the current phase came from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev: peace exists, but trust does not yet.
The statement captures the contradiction at the heart of the process. The immediate danger of another war has declined, but both sides still question whether the other will carry out its obligations.
For Azerbaijan, the test will be the practical opening of communications under the agreed conditions. For Armenia, it will be whether the government can implement its decisions despite pressure from Moscow and Tehran, Russian influence over infrastructure and domestic political resistance.
Alili said cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey could give Armenia additional tools to pursue a more independent and balanced foreign policy. To do so, however, Yerevan would have to choose between preserving its old system of dependence and participating in a new regional architecture.
The peace process has not stopped. But its easiest phase may already be over. The parties must now move from declarations to decisions affecting the concrete interests of Russia, Iran, the United States and competing political forces within Armenia.
That is why the existence of peace has not yet produced trust.
AZE.US